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This study is concerned with the Finnish government’s political programmes (N=42) from the 1950s to the present. Its objective is to examine how conceptions of the welfare state have changed over the past 65 years. The analysis concentrates on the social and health care sectors as indicators of the content and nature of the ambitions set for the welfare system by the highest political leadership. The programmes were examined for their aims, character and concepts. The governments’ changing position towards its welfare political mandate emerges in three distinct periods: 1) 1950 through the 1970s, when the welfare state was being constructed; 2) the 1980s and 1990s, as the concept was further developed and internally synchronized; and 3) 2000 to 2015, a time of increasing estrangement from universal notions. The study shows that as late as 2014, the welfare state’s aims of inclusion and universalism were dramatically toned down to an absolute minimum in the government programmes. The article shows that in contemporary times, the coalition government system may have strengthened the welfare state ethos. This is a finding of great significance for a structural-political perspective on the support of welfare state ideas.

Introduction

In the classical division of welfare state models by Esping-Andersen (1990), the Nordic, or social democratic, variant entails particular value prioritizations. It involves a belief in universal welfare for everyone and a trust in autonomous public institutions executing their welfare political goals. This type of welfare state has been described as an all-encompassing form of solidarity. Dignity and value come with citizenship; because everyone is equally at risk of misfortune, no further expectations are placed on the citizen in the welfare provision system (Julkunen 2006). Widely based solidarity and the aim of caring for less fortunate citizens have been strong (Anttonen & Sipilä 2000). High income taxation, used to finance centralized and universal service provision, is perhaps the most well-known systemic procedure for achieving the collective-based welfare system envisioned in the model.

With regard to the constitution and maintenance of this type of welfare system, compassion for human suffering and good intentions in regard to helping weak and marginalized groups are not sufficient ends in themselves. Such ambitions can just as well lead to welfare pluralistic social policy or non-institutionalized and residual solutions such as ad hoc charity and social work by the church (Anttonen & Sipilä 2000, 106). The existence of a universal system that permeates a country’s institutional configurations depends on whether the interest groups behind the state power and its legitimacy view it as an appropriate alternative and advance in their strategies (ibid.). The support and maintenance of the Nordic welfare system have been shown to require constant justifications in political visions and strategies. This is an ongoing discursive effort that must endure in the different arenas in which political and governmental aims are articulated.

This study examines how 42 Finnish government programmes have articulated ideas surrounding the welfare state from the 1950s to the present. These 65 years in Finnish history encompass the first post-war construction of a welfare society, followed by the establishment and reorganization of the same. Although their formats have changed over time, the Finnish government programmes have retained a somewhat consistent historical function: to serve as an of-
ficial declaration of what the elected government envisions and hopes to achieve during its time in office.

The importance of government programmes in communicating the political strategies that underpin the development of the Finnish welfare state should not be underestimated: their rhetoric has been shown to carry great potential for institutional change (Erkkiä 2010, 353-354). In fact, the societal structure can be viewed as being articulated and reproduced in the political construction rituals of the platforms (see Heiskala 2001). Finalized in negotiations between the winning parties after the general election, they articulate the direction that the country should take as a whole, as voiced by the highest political leadership. In what ways, then, has the development of Finland’s government programmes entailed ideological shifts pertaining to the scope and mandate of the welfare state?

This study sets out to investigate how the programmes envision developments in the social and health sectors in a long view. As classical social policy cornerstones of the Nordic universal welfare state, the social and health sectors are here viewed as indicators of the system's content and nature (Hellman et al. 2012). The analysis seeks to provide an updated periodization narrative based on the discursive governance of the top political leadership. This is achieved through examining the aims and directions envisioned in the platforms and by studying the characteristics of the genre in view of the government’s position and, the priorities reflected in the concepts and language used.

The study is situated in a structural-political perspective, in that it observes that a continuous interplay between the social structure and political action underpins the building and maintenance of the Finnish welfare state (Alestalo et al. 1986). The article begins with broad accounts of some characteristics in the Finnish welfare state and some recent trends in its modes of governance. Subsequently, it accounts for a diachronic analysis of the government programmes from 1950 through 2015, asking how the welfare state as a project has been articulated over time. Finally, conclusions are drawn regarding what the results mean from a structural-political perspective.

**Universal welfare in Finland**

The particularities in the Finnish universal welfare state can be explained in view of the country’s political history. In Finland, as in the other Nordic countries, it has been historically safe and wise to make a moderate distinction between communist and capitalist ideologies and to augment public management by patiently increasing universal services over time (Julkunen 2006; Úusitalo 1984). Doing so has improved the working population’s ability to participate in occupational life and has been an economic advantage for Finland (Kantola 2006, 21). The tripartite political negotiations (labour unions – state – employers’ organizations) have been viewed as supporting economic competition without risking the aims of equality.

In Hiilamo’s (2014) account, an important backdrop for the Finnish welfare state’s characteristics is the country’s Civil War in 1918 between the Reds (led by radicals in the Social Democratic Party and Bolshevik sympathizers) and the Whites (led by the Senate). In the wake of this war – one of the bloodiest civil wars on the European continent – key elements of the rebuilding process included expanding social policies, implementing extensive land reforms, modernizing the educational system and using social insurance funds as investment capital. Universal social policies and universal education both paved the way for accepting the welfare state as an agent of solidarity, and these first measures served as important manifestations of solidarity and unity within the nation (Hiilamo 2014).

Compared to other Nordic countries Finland’s political party structure deviates in ways that to some extent also can be attributed to the need for unity after the Civil War. One of the most important differences is the large and strong Agrarian party that has taken a watershed position between the left and the right (Alestalo 1986, 114-115). Consequently, compared to Sweden, for example, the questions of sparsely populated, remote rural areas and support for agriculture and small farming have been a more explicit part of the welfare state’s agenda. The great size of Finland’s Centre Party (Suomen Keskusta, founded as the Agrarian League) not only reflects the fact that the country’s agricultural population has historically been much larger than in Scandinavia or in Western Europe (Alestalo 1986, 25) but also is a result of the divisions in the rural areas caused by the Civil War. The Centre Party came to offer alternatives to both communist and conservative agendas by projecting the image of a united rural population front. As a realistic alternative to communism, the Centre Party integrated, for example, welfare policies and workers’ rights for the rural areas in its political agendas (Kettunen 2001). In comparison, the Swedish welfare state was more explicitly and extensively built around an ideology of “factory chimney” social democracy. The Swedish working class has had a higher level of mobilization and a more stable governmental dominance over time (Kosonen 2002; Salminen 1987, 38; for an overview of Finnish political parties, see, e.g., Mickelsson 2007). In contemporary times, a notable difference from other Nordic countries is that Finland does not have a strict political block system; rather, the government can be mixed between parties of the left and right (Pesonen 2001, 121).

A further circumstance that distinguishes Finland from other Nordic welfare states has been the relationship with the Soviet Union, which for many years had to be balanced and kept friendly. This left its mark on both national and international policymaking until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The rise of Finland’s current universal welfare state began in the 1960s, later than in other Nordic countries. As the welfare agenda took shape, the state began to assume an all-encompassing responsibility for health care and social welfare. According to Hiilamo (2014), until the early 1990s, there was no reason to challenge the social democratic welfare state hypothesis: “The Nordic countries had developed comprehensive earnings-related benefits for the employed and flat rate benefits for individuals outside the labour market, leaving hardly any room for selective church
poor relief or inclusion Programmes at the state or municipal levels” (Hiilamo 2014, 303). In fact, in the late 1980s, the general conception was that the Nordic welfare state had provided a permanent solution for such matters as the problem of poverty in Finland. Income inequality was then the lowest in the industrialized world (ibid.).

In the early 1990s, the situation changed. Finland was hit by a great economic recession. Although the recession was followed by a recovery starting in 1994 and the country went on to experience robust economic growth, basic benefits were left to stagnate. In the early 2000s, Finland chose not to reverse the cutbacks in social protection and allowed inflation to erode existing benefits even further. Despite steady economic growth and strong public finances, only minor improvements were made to basic welfare benefits, which has led to labelling the Finnish welfare state as a case of “permanent austerity” (Alanko & Outilin 2016; Hiilamo 2014, 304, 306). It has been claimed that Finland began to edge away from the ideals of the universal welfare model in the 1990s. This study looks for traces of this breakeage in the action plans and visions of the highest political leadership.

Recent developments

In most Western societies, since the early 1990s, economic and ideological pressures have made larger rationale-based public sector change initiatives unavoidable. Particularly after the recession of the 1990s, the high tax level in the Nordic countries began to be heavily criticized as harming the dynamics of business life and economic growth (A. Kantola & Kautto 2002, 40-41). The pressures to make the public sector more affordable reached record intensity after the global financial crisis in 2008. In some cases, the courses of action taken have been shown to affect the scope, mandates and accountability of service provision in ways that may undermine the political objectives of inclusion and universalism of welfare states (Bryson et al. 2014; Curry 2014; Walker et al. 2011). Hintsa (2003) has studied Finnish administrations’ modes of governance in the years 1987-2003, identifying interventionist, welfare and competitive models. Both Hintsa’s (2003) and Lähdesmäki’s (2003) studies of this period note the governments’ increasing dependence on corporate models and a distancing from universalist aims.

The new welfare state threats and pressures have engaged the social sciences in analyses of new governance trends and their implications for the welfare state ethos. Around the mid-1990s, welfare state research thus came to change its focus from characterizing welfare state systems to understanding the processes that dismantled the same (starting with Pierson 1995). The most recent developments in welfare state governance are often portrayed as an ideologically steered broad implementation of praxis that severely weakens the state’s core obligations to its citizens (Haltmea 2015). For example, Kosonen (2002 [1993]) describes how from the 1960s to the 1980s, welfare systems following a Nordic model were institutionalized in Finland but that “[i]n the 1990s, this development has come to an end, and all proposals point to cuts and reductions in social transfers and public services” (Kosonen 2002 [1993], 45). The social scientific dogma seems to be that of an ideological breakeage with the welfare state ethos in the 1990s. However, the characteristics of the Finnish welfare model since 2000 are still those of affordable services available to all; partly citizenship-based, partly occupational life- and income-based benefits; small discrepancies in incomes; and a large number of women in occupational life (see Kantola & Kautto 2002).

Recent research indicates that the current government, led by Centre party member Juha Sipilä from 2015 to 2019, has taken on a new governmentality incarnated in strategic visionary government programmes (Elomäki et al. 2016). This mode of governance introduces new conditions for political agency and expertise channelled in semantics that involve terms such as flexibility, efficiency, new companionships, profitability, productivity, competitiveness, know-how, innovation and strategy thinking (ibid., 379, referring to; Julkunen 2010; Kantola 2006; Kuusela & Ylönen 2013). Elomäki and colleagues (2016) have dubbed it “the strategic government” (“strateginen valtio”).

There are some interesting structural-political circumstances that must be noted regarding the role of the platforms in the transformation into strategic government. A circumstance that very much concerns the Nordic welfare state ethos is the changed role that the governments’ platforms play in the system. For public institutions of the executive power, that is, the structural backbone of the system’s implementation, the platforms serve as overall guidelines for their upcoming work period, albeit acknowledging and respecting their autonomous position, praxis and functions as the executive sector. Over time, the platforms have tended to become increasingly detailed and lengthy – a circumstance already discussed in an alarmed tone in a report from 2010 by the Finnish Innovation Fund SITRA (Määttä & Sitra 2010). It notes that flexible top-down governance is obstructed by government programmes that are too sectorial and detailed: “Detailed programmes in difficult political questions may clarify the government’s work, but [the details] make it more difficult to change the programme during the time in power, even if there would be a need for them [adjustments]” (Määttä & Sitra 2010, 36). The lack of possibilities to make strategic changes during the cabinet’s time in office is noted as a problem.

As a consequence of the frustration over the platforms’ growing format, during the National Coalition-led mixed coalition government in 2014-2015 (Stubb), a Development Project for State Governance, the so called OHRA-programme was contracted, suggesting a shift from the broad platforms that include concrete measures to ‘strategic’ platforms (VM 2014). The aim of the OHRA-programme, as stated in the title of the main document, was to shift from “decisions” to “changes”. The programme states that the recent Finnish government programmes had been too abundant with regard to different aims, resulting in ‘unclear political visions’. The OHRA programme emphasized that the work of the government should be presented in larger alignments and that the specifics would be left to be de-
cided upon by the government during its time in office. In the OHRA-programme, strategic planning was suggested to be combined with a ‘plan of action’ (toimintasuunnitelma) and a public financial plan, to be backed up with knowledge (VM 2014). A research programme was created within the Finnish Academy to fund ‘strategic research’ (research funding 2017; VM 2014). Although the platform by Sipilä’s cabinet (2015-2019) does not explicitly refer to the OHRA programme, the analysis shows that it is very much articulating its visions both in content and format (see also Elomäki et al. 2016). Common sense would indeed suggest that detailed programmes tend to lock in the execution of certain agendas, whereas more overall visions leave room for ad hoc top down management. However, what do these formats imply with regard to the strength of the welfare state ethos in government programmes?

Finnish government programmes are not a new subject of study; they have been previously examined with different objectives (e.g., Borg 1965; Ekman 2016; Erkkilä 2010; Hakovirta & Koskiaho 1973; Ketola 2008; Kärki 2015; Saarinen et al. 2014). Regarding the governmental discourse, previous research has shown, for example, that the rhetoric in Vanhanen’s second programme (2007-2011) stressed economy and efficiency concerning welfare policy (Kesilähti 2011). In 2006, Anu Kantola (2006) analysed governmental texts and programmes starting in the late 1980s and showed that competitive rhetoric drawn from private company management discourse had already reached a peak. Although Finnish government programmes have on many occasions served as study materials, there is a lack of analyses from longer periods of developments in view genre and of welfare state agendas.

Material and proceedings

To perform a diachronic inquiry into the welfare state ethos in governmental programmes, three questions were posed to the material: (1) What are the overall aims and direction construed? Will, for example, the breakage in the 1990s, as noted by several previous studies (Hiilamo 2014; Niemelä 2008), be visible in the governmental discourse? (2) What are the characteristics of the genre of the proposed programme, and what are its functions? What will the OHRA-suggested turn towards more broadly held visions imply in view of the welfare state ethos? (3) What types of priorities and ideologies are reflected in the concepts and language used? Here, we were particularly interested in changes that indicate a drifting from a use of language that incorporates universalism and inclusion. Is there some type of ideological shift occurring in the programmes over time in general and, more specifically, in view of the changes studied in questions 1 and 2?

To obtain a longer view of the developments of the governmentality discourse of the Finnish welfare state, we examined government programmes starting with the year 1950 (all programmes are available on the internet at a. Valtioneuvosto2016a). The decision to include early programmes enabled us to observe the first constructs of an emerging welfare state. From the government’s internet pages, each administration’s programme was copy-pasted into a main document (total length: 119,596 words). During the first readings, segments addressing issues of social welfare and health were coded and separated. These segments (ca. 15,000 words) were studied in more detail, posing the three research questions regarding the aims and direction construed, the characteristics of the genre and their functions, priorities and ideologies reflected in the concepts and language used. This framework of aims-functions-concepts was employed as a qualitative content analytical tool (see Bowen 2009), in line with basic semiotic approaches on the ways in which ontologies and epistemologies are formulated in text to fix, strengthen and push progress towards certain resolutions (see, e.g., Alasuutari & Qadir 2014; Hellman & Room 2015; Lyotard 1984).

The analysis follows a governmentality tradition that links welfare state governance with ideas, as expressed in political text (see, e.g., Bacchi 2009; McKee 2009; Rose & Miller 1992). As political declarations, the platforms involve expressions of governmentality, which is a gathering term used for the mentalities, rationalities, and techniques through which subjects are governed and which governments use to adjust the collectives suited to fulfil their policies. The governments, their time in power, the political stance of the prime minister and the programmes’ length are shown in the appendix table 1.

The character of the programmes has changed over time. In the 1950s and 1960s, the statements consisted of short paragraphs and concerned the stability of the nation. Subsequently, they became more ideological and incorporated a clear social welfare ethos. In the third phase, they were long declarations of action with clearly stated visions and goals. After the OHRA project, which set out to shorten the programmes and shift them from concrete objectives to ‘strategic’ governing, the most recent programme has taken a new form.

In the stage of selecting the studied material from the programmes, the researchers had to decide what to classify as social and health issues. The first programmes do not contain action plans or specific visions of what the administration wished to achieve, and it was difficult to separate welfare questions from other issues, given that conceptual political categories for these matters did not exist in the same manner as they do today. In the earliest programmes, developing better welfare and social security could be expressed in terms of labour-market policies and aims for developing rural areas. The later programmes included clear articulations of social and health policy aims. In the earlier programmes, we identified some general political strategies for the welfare, wellbeing and good health of the population; we viewed these questions as corresponding to the types of material that would later be explicitly placed in the social and health care sectors. In this article, accounts of the developments are generalized, and many interesting and important thematic traits in the developments of the questions have been omitted, owing to the lack of space.
Before taking up the analysis, it is important to remind the reader that because Finland does not have a strict block party system for the constellation of the cabinet, the main visions do not have to be either left or right in character but can be mixed. Particularly in the later years, the programmes of majority coalition governments have been the results of intense and complicated negotiations between the parties in office. A good example of a mixed agenda is Jyrki Katainen’s programme from 2011 – a government popularly referred to as “the six pack”. Both the National Coalition Party (Kokoomus, on the right) and the Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) were among the six parties involved in this government.

In the long view, the trend in Finnish governments’ political composition can be summarized as “from minority governments to majority coalitions” (Valtioneuvosto 2016b). Since its independence in 1917, Finland has had 73 governments and 43 prime ministers. The longest-serving governments have been those led by Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, a Social Democrat, whose two administrations in the 1990s totalled 1,464 days. Of all Finnish administrations, 45 have been majority governments; 19 have been minority governments; and 9 have been non-partisan caretaker/civil servants’ governments. Finland’s last minority or caretaker government was in the mid-1970s (ibid.). As shown in Table 1, the 1950s and early 1960s saw diverse and ever-changing coalitions. The key party was the Agrarian Union (which would become the Centre Party). Between 1966 and 1987, governments were mainly based on centre-left coalitions, sometimes termed popular-front governments. A left-right coalition led by Harri Holkeri served between 1987 and 1991, followed by a non-socialist centre-right coalition between the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party in 1991-1995 led by Esko Aho. In the Lipponen government, elected in 1995, the Greens and a broad spectrum of leftist parties were represented, in addition to the National Coalition Party. The traditional red-earth government co-operation between the Centre Party and the Social Democrats was resumed in 2003 when Anneli Jäätteenmäki’s government took office – a work that was performed by Matti Vanhanen’s first government 2003 after Jäätteenmäki’s resignation (Ibid.) Vanhanen’s second government, from the spring of 2007, was a majority coalition formed by the Centre Party, the National Coalition Party, the Green League and the Swedish People’s Party of Finland. A traditionally liberal party, the Swedish People’s Party has participated in almost all of the various coalitions but is notably absent in the current government (ibid.).

Analysis

Based on the analysis of the coded parts of the material, three coherent periods emerge as discursive entities: the first from the 1950s through the 1970s; the second, the 1980s and 1990s; and the third beginning at the beginning of the 2000s. The programme of the current government (2015) deviated to a degree in that it was viewed as representing a category of its own within the third phase. The programmes for each period bear certain similarities in the three areas of analytical inquiries: first, the overall aims of the country’s direction in terms of welfare policies are reflected in general visions that are apparent in priorities and the language used and in the numbers of topics and details. Naturally, these aims should be viewed in the historical context in which they were formulated. Second, the periods can be distinguished by the genre character of the government programmes. The roles of the programmes in their own political context of origin and their aims for the welfare state are revealed in how the government views its tasks and positions itself in the text. Third, particular concepts bear witness to each political leadership’s priorities. The average lengths for each period are shown in Figure 1.

The first phase: Building a Finnish welfare state, 1950s-1970s

The thirteen programmes from the 1950s are short declarations with an average of 364 words (475 counting appendices). They articulate goals for stabilizing the country and maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union. “Specifically, with regard to developing and consolidating friendly relationships with the Soviet Union and Finland, Finland will follow the content and the spirit of the agreements that the Finnish and Soviet relationships are based on” (1953_Tuomioja).1

Tearing down the “tyrannical rules from war time” (1950_Kekkonen) and creating jobs (1953_Tuomioja) were

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1 In parentheses: the year of the programme and the name of the prime minister. Translations from Finnish into English are made by authors.
strategies for developing Finland’s economy. The 1954 programme formulated the government’s “aim at upholding a policy that will keep the developments moving forward by taking as its goal improving the population’s wellbeing and increasing social security within the framework of improving the endurance of the nation’s economy” (1954_Törngren).

A view of developments in agricultural life, improving conditions for small farmers and improving life for inhabitants in rural and remote areas as a basis for prosperity and welfare are apparent throughout the 1950s: “Agriculture and forestry and ensuring the jobs of the rural population with proper means are to be secured against competition from abroad” (1959_Sukselainen).

The improvement of the life conditions of citizens in rural areas is viewed as an important welfare political aim of the country as a whole. In 1959 (Fagerholm), the government says that it will take measures to rationalize agriculture externally and internally and the income of the agricultural population’s relative living standard: “With the help of agricultural support measures, the inequity that part-time unemployment has imposed upon the interpretation of the vacation law will be corrected. The government will start preparing implementation of health insurance” (1958_Fagerholm). Sukselainen’s cabinet from 1959 promises to act “in line with the existing law on agricultural income” and to aim at securing the benefits of agricultural smallholders and the life status of the rural population. In 1961, the concept of a fair social policy (oikeudenmukainen sosiaalipolitiikka) is used to describe the goal of guaranteeing the rights of all population groups, with special attention given to those living in the least favourable economic and social conditions (1961_Miettunen).

Ahti Karjalainen’s Centre Party programme from 1962 is the first to include a section on social policy. The themes concern health security for all citizen groups, referred to as “population circuits” (väestöpiirit) and “population groups” (väestöryhmät). A core question concerns how working hours could be shortened to strengthen workers’ wellbeing but allowing the country to remain competitive. The government announces its support for the labour unions’ aims for a 40-hour work week. A gradual rise in child benefits (lapsilisä) is declared, and economic resources delegated for housing construction address the housing shortage.

The late 1950s and the 1960s involve great investments in universal and egalitarian reforms in Finland. The national pension reform in 1957, the introduction of general sickness insurance in 1964, and the pension reforms in the 1960s would allow Finland to suddenly leap from a social security coverage laggard to one of the top countries in Western Europe (Alestanlonen et al. 1985, 193-194). Although the platforms from this time are not specified declarations of how the institutionalized social and health service provisions are to be realized, the programmes show a great deal of visions of a structural implementation of welfare in an egalitarian and universal spirit.

The view of work and employment issues as the basis for welfare and standards of a good life is expressed throughout the early 1960s. In the 1966 programme of Social Demo-
Democratic emphasis despite its conservative prime minister, phrases such as “the government will improve” (Hallitus parantaa) and “the government will continue” (Hallitus jatkaa) are used. The formulations mediate the notion of a construction of the welfare state as still partly ongoing but in a different fashion from the 1960s and 1970s. The groups identified as needing to be better integrated and included are not so much the farmers and rural population groups but the homeless, the retired and the elderly. The pension system for small entrepreneurs is to be improved, and private service providers would complement public institutions as needed.

During the depression of 1991, the programme of the Esko Aho-led government (Centre Party) includes the subheading “Social and Health Care”. Here, the Government expresses its intention to improve (not to found or develop) the population’s basic social security (“perusturvallisuus”). The programme frames the economic recession from a social perspective:

In times when matters are economically tight, it is important to guarantee peoples’ minimum income at different stages of life. The basic security is to be strengthened within the limits of possibility of the state’s economy, considering the social compensation measures caused by the economic invigoration. (1991_Aho)

The government is to “simplify” the basic income system (Perustoimeentulojärjestelmä yksinkertaistetaan). The standard of services is to be secured and developed to ensure social equality: “To secure and develop the standard of services, the policy of payment must be reorganized, bearing in mind social inequality; the collaboration between social and health care, as well as the administration, is to be simplified”. In 1991, there is a call for efficiency; however, viewed in retrospect, the programme contains a clear social ethos. The country is to prepare for incoming refugees and is to aim at decreasing alcohol consumption, particularly among young people.

In the first of the two subsequent programmes – one in 1995 and the other in 1999 – under Paavo Lipponen (Social Democrat), a social and health care policy and the development of work and employment are presented in a somewhat comprehensive manner: these programmes are lengthier and more specific in content than ever before. This is partly because the Platforms were formulated by a government with mixed interests and ideologies: in both Lipponen governments, there were members of the National Coalition Party, the Greens, the Left Party and the Swedish People’s Party, in addition to Social Democrats. In the 2,697-word statement of 1995, certain aims are justified in ways that reflect typical contemporary universal welfare state values: “Society [Yhteiskunta] is to guarantee basic service for all population groups. The public service provision system forms the base of the social and health care services” (1995_Lipponen). The private sector, organizations in the social and health sector and “the work conducted by close relatives and loved ones” are viewed only as complementing this base. Equality in the public sector is to be ensured through work/occupational policies: “The conditions for employment and other service conditions will be developed according to the principles of parity between employees. The government will improve equality in working life and the principle of equal pay through co-operation with labour market organizations” (1995_Lipponen).

The second Lipponen government (1999) has the most extensive social political agenda of all 42 programmes and includes a separate section on “social and health care policy and work life”. The introductory sentence states:

The point of departure for the government’s social policy is the maintenance of the Nordic welfare state. The goal is to develop a society that guarantees all people the opportunity to manage their own lives and actively participate. A core field of government emphasis will be to promote measures by which serious poverty problems, marginalization and a pile-up of disadvantages are prevented and reduced. The quality and availability of social and health care services will be guaranteed in all parts of the country. (1999_Lipponen)

The welfare state ethos is expressed immediately at the start: “An active social policy entails the prevention of poverty and social exclusion”. Furthermore, an ideological position on the state’s role is articulated: “The arrangement of social and health services, which is the responsibility of public authorities, must be accessible to all, and they should be paid for largely through taxes”.

The point of departure is a large and developed public sector that requires no justification (as was the case in the programmes from the 1970s and 1980s) but, instead, is made more efficient to serve the ideal of a fair and equal Nordic welfare model. The programme aims at equalization, with special allowances and services for groups with special problems (erityisryhmiä ongelmat).

The Lipponen platform of 1999 articulates the most extensive vision of the universal and egalitarian welfare state of all the programmes, including values to be secured and concrete actions to be taken to secure the standards and to develop the welfare state into something more efficient and better. In the next phase, the programmes move even closer towards action agendas; they have new functions and are positioned in a different manner vis-à-vis other societal sectors.

Third phase: Lengthy action plans, 2003 - 2015

In 2003, the programme of the Centre Party government originally led by Anneli Jäätteenmäki contains declarations on how to integrate and synchronize policy development and projects in the social and health sectors. In this era, greater emphasis begins to be placed on the municipality as a service producer. The idea is that the welfare state should primarily be managed within the structures offered by the municipality system: “The Government will increase resources in public health and social care, and it will develop competence, service structures and ways of working together over the
long term with the municipalities in accordance with the National Health Project’s principal decision” (2003 Jääteenmäki). At this point, the municipality emphasis coincides with the goals of efficiency in the social and health care sectors. This is in line with previous research that has dated a strong New Public Management (NPM) discourse to the late 1990s and the 2000s in the ambitions set for how local government units should implement ambitions in these fields in the most cost-efficient manner (see Niemelä 2008; Sulkunen 2006).

The 2003 programme further states: “Population health inequalities will be sought to be reduced with the help of goal-orientated health and social policy measures as well as by strengthening the aspects of health and social wellbeing in societal decision-making”. The governed are no longer noted as groups; rather, a passive voice is used for describing phenomena (health inequalities, health, achieving wellbeing). Verbs in the passive voice are frequently used: “The use of vouchers will be investigated” (selvitetään); “the recovery of war invalids is to be developed” (kehitetään); “the quality of the care of the elderly is to be improved” (parannetaan). The welfare system user is an individual: “The system must ensure adequate security. The livelihood and survival of the citizen [ihminen] must be viewed from the comprehensive perspective of work, taxation, social security and services”. Essentially, the tasks are to develop and renew, and they are listed to guarantee service availability.

In the programme led by Matti Vanhanen (Centre Party, 2007-2010), new challenges are presented:

Population ageing, labour market transformations and globalization pose new challenges for the Finnish welfare society and working life. By encouraging and disseminating basic security and safety in peoples’ everyday life, the government aims at improving the effectiveness and diversity of services and enhancing human well-being. Finland’s welfare in the 2010s requires a strong economy and high employment rates. (2007 Vanhanen)

The basis for a functioning welfare society is now articulated as a sound economy and high levels of employment. The basis of health and wellbeing rests in economic success and vice versa: “Healthy and highly capable people are the foundation of Finland’s economic success and competitiveness. Health and social policy aims to promote health, functional capacity and independence and to reduce health disparities between different population groups” (2007 Vanhanen).

The key to counteracting marginalization is strengthening productivity and job availability:

The aim is to support the increase in productivity and labour supply. Work is also the best way of preventing social exclusion and combating poverty. The high level of competence of employees, an atmosphere supporting creativity, wellbeing and functioning labour markets are important national success factors.

The availability of choices for families and cross-sectoral partnerships are stressed: “Families are to be supported and service choices improved by increasing partnerships between the public, private and third sectors” (2007 Vanhanen).

The programme of the National Coalition Party-led mixed government from 2011, led by Jyrki Katainen, shows how both the historical context and the political system colour Finnish governmental programmes. The context is the so-called jytky, a surprisingly large win by the populist True Finns Party (today, called the Finns Party) in the spring election of 2011. Jyrki Katainen had a difficult job assembling a government that would represent a parliamentary majority but exclude the True Finns. The result was a so-called rainbow government, also referred to as ‘the six pack’: the National Coalition Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Swedish People’s Party, the Christian Party and the Left Party. In the programme’s lengthy text, a record 26,737 words, the section headed “Welfare Policy” includes a mention of the Nordic welfare society:

Healthy citizens, education, a high employment rate, comprehensive income security, and impactful health and social services are the conditions of the Nordic welfare society’s social and economic sustainability. The main focus in developing social security is the improvement of quality, accessibility and effectiveness of services and in the development of benefits such that the livelihood for each [citizen] is secured. Social security helps strengthen the sense of community and encourages action to promote personal wellbeing and taking responsibility for oneself and for loved ones. (2011 Katainen)

The justification of the services and their quality is now partly to be found in a life quality argument. In comparison, Lipponen’s 1999 programme envisioned the aims ideologically: the point of departure was a social policy that would guarantee preserving the Nordic welfare state, and society would be developed to improve opportunity for equal participation. Although the first paragraph in Katainen’s programme of 2007 contains elements similar to Lipponen’s, the wellbeing of citizens is now directly connected with economic sustainability and the quality and availability of services. If Lipponen’s perspective in the rear-view mirror seems to be that of a political leadership envisioning a country built on ideals, then Katainen’s perspective is increasingly that of a manager who will improve and steer services so that they will lead to the same type of envisioned wellbeing.

It is clear that much of Katainen’s extensive programme was decided in lengthy negotiations between very different views on state governance (among the six pack). The result was that detailed tasks are now spelled out, with large and small questions mixed. Work has a central role in improving wellbeing. Guarantees for basic economic support for the weakest and poorest groups are increased. Visions and actions are connected: “The income support guidelines will be specified, considering in particular the prevention
of intergenerational poverty and social exclusion. Simultaneously, citizens are encouraged to take responsibility for their own lives” (2011_Katainen). The programme presents myriad large and small plans for actions and interventions, among them, restructuring social and welfare services, ensuring emergency and duty services, realizing service strategies, guaranteeing medical helicopter service, updating the national HIV plan, access to abortion, monitoring and following up the consequences of gambling, and a better language translation service at the Social Security Institution of Finland (KELA). In view of the long negotiations and compromises made in Katainen’s platform, the OHRA initiative seems a logical next move. The OHRA project was set to steer towards a new method of establishing platforms that would be less binding and allow more ‘strategic’ visions supported by knowledge of the country’s economy and ‘policy-relevant’ academic research.

The citizen is in Katainen’s platform now called the client or the consumer (in Finnish, asiakas). The term is noted in the first paragraph; further on, invalids, the elderly and children are referred to as “client groups” (asiakasryhmät). The programme does not speak of “marginalized people/groups” but of syrjäytyminen, that is, marginalization as a phenomenon. An interesting question that may be a result of the colourful crowd in the administration is the theme of transparency in service chains, a question easily agreed upon. Transparency is always needed when those in charge do not agree on aims. The picture that the reader obtains from this very lengthy and detailed programme is that in the course of setting up the government, the parties brought all questions that they wanted to include to the table for negotiation. Once a compromise position was agreed upon in wording, it was integrated into the programme. The document is permeated with expertise on political issues and on the system and its institutions. It is clear that professional politicians – those highest ranked – from somewhat established older parties (even the somewhat young Green Party was by then well established) had worked together. In the background is a great deal of competence, although the number of disagreements may have contributed to the great detail. The signal to the executive sector, that is, the civil servants in the ministries and municipalities, is that this programme offers a detailed plan that can be followed similarly to a road map.

In the last year of the six-pack party governmental period, Katainen stepped down, and his National Coalition Party colleague Alexander Stubb replaced him as prime minister. The platform by Stubb is a short supplement orientated towards business life and boosting the Finnish economy. The words Suomi and suomalaiset (“Finland” and “Finnish people”) are notably employed in Stubb’s programme, which is called “Growth, entrepreneurship, jobs and prosperity for Finns”. Finland’s ability to compete is stressed:

The government is systematically seeking new ways to improve Finland’s competitiveness, strengthen the operating conditions of the export industry, increase purchasing power and domestic demand, reduce barriers to entrepreneurship, promote employment and support high-quality teaching. Decision-making supporting competition is to be structured, predictable and long term. (2014_Stubb)

Suomi is now the protagonist, which needs to get on its feet similar to a company in the business world: “In all activities, Finland emphasizes the importance of the principle of corporate responsibility”. A network called “Team Finland” is to be consulted to ensure economic growth. Stubb also issues some strategic programmes that go along with the declarations (see Table 1)

Although changes had been coming gradually, a real character transformation in the Government Programmes occurred in 2015. Led by Juha Sipilä (Centre Party), whose background includes leading positions with several companies, the three-party government (the Centre Party, the National Coalition and the True Finns) formulates a platform that although not very lengthy (9,798 words), is the first to contain numerous graphs and figures in the running text; it resembles a corporate development outlook. In the section “Wellbeing and Health”, we find the statement “Objectives and their measurement set in a ten-year goal: Finns feel better and feel that they can manage in different life situations”. This sentence is indicative of the programme as a whole: it contains a vision of self-confident self-governing citizens, somewhat different from the visions of, for example, Lipponen’s second government from 1999. The programme from 2015 states:

Differently aged people’s responsibility for their own health status and lifestyle is supported. The promise of public service is defined within the framework of the society’s economic capacity. People’s choices in different life situations are enabled to a greater extent.... People’s opportunities to make their own choices are enabled. (2015_Sipila)

The programme enumerates in short points the action to be taken: “A national programme that promotes mental health and prevents loneliness will be launched. – A comprehensive reform of the rehabilitation system will be implemented. – A report on lonely people’s position in society will be conducted. – Substance abuse rehabilitation will be made more efficient”.

However, nowhere are these aims concretized with detailed descriptions of their implementation in the welfare institutions, as in Katainen’s programme (2011), nor are they envisioned as value choices, as in Lipponen’s second programme (1999). Although there are promises for improving home services for the elderly, for instance, and the living conditions for others, nowhere is it stated how these improvements will be realized. A sample sentence is “A sense of community and intergenerational contact is to be enhanced ["lisätään"]”; however, how this aim is to be achieved is left unspecified. It is clear that this platform has adapted the strategic governance suggested by OHRA.

The ideals of the autonomous capable citizen has now pushed ideas of universalist solutions aside, and the format
The Sipilä programme does not specify its aims, and therefore, it does not lock in any details. It offers seemingly simple goals and visions, leaving the interpretation of execution for future situation-based flexible governmental decision-making. Whereas the ministries’ civil servants could read Katainen’s programme of 2011 as a detailed action list, the Sipilä blueprint is less precise and relies on interpretation to transform its ideas into actions. In fact, the programme relies on clarifying top-down governance to determine what is actually meant when words are translated into deeds.

Whereas the lengthy Katainen programme demonstrated that those around the negotiating table were all long-term politicians (the six pack) who had great insight into the state’s institutions and processes, the Sipilä programme can perhaps be read as reflecting the limited political background of many of the True Finns and that of a prime minister, who had spent much of his career in business. Table 1 summarizes the study findings. The government programme of 2015 is presented as a separate category because it deviates so much from the rest.

Discussion and conclusions

This study offers insight into developments in the Finnish welfare state enterprise through the lens of the governmental programmes’ visions concerning the social and health sectors. The historical narrative that unfolds begins with governments’ attempts to create stability in the post-war era. In the 1950s, the programmes consist of short declarations with a general focus mainly on national stability. The first constructs of Nordic welfare state policies enter the programmes in the 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s, the documents note weaker societal groups in need of assistance. By the time of Koivisto’s programme (1968), “social questions” (sosiaaliset kysymykset) have become a topic on their own. In 1970 (Karjalainen’s second administration), there is even a subheading “Social policy and health care service (Sosialipoliitikka ja terveydenhuolto).

In the late 1980s, the welfare state as a context is more taken for granted. The state welfare sector has grown larger and must be secured, strengthened, developed, internally synchronized and made more efficient. However, as late as Pauvo Lipponen’s Social Democratic programmes of the 1990s, these changes are still being envisioned, articulated and justified in terms of basic universalist ideas, particularly in Lipponen’s second programme (1999). By considering the aims, character and concepts of the studied documents, we identify a paradigm shift in the welfare state discourse starting after Lipponen’s second programme. Several previous studies have referred to a semantics of the New Public Management discourse occurring in the late 1980s. Erkkilä (2010) states that Esko Aho’s platform (1991-1995) builds “on the normative vocabulary of the New Public Management doctrines” (Erkkilä 2010, 362). Although this may be true, the present analysis of social and health questions discerns a distinct paradigm shift in the government programmes pertaining to how the welfare state project was articulated, starting with Anneli Jäätteenmäki (2003). In fact, even Katainen’s platform (2011), which in many ways is filled with market-liberal notions, operates very closely along detailed welfare institutional concepts. This study is thus able to empirically demonstrate the ways in which Finnish coalition governments incarnate Castles hypothesis (Castles 1978; 1982), according to which the welfare state is not so much the product of strong social democracy but of splits within the right wing. The colourful group of allies and its adherent detailed compromise-based governmental programme format forced the right to compromise and incorporate welfare political constructs that the more general declarations by homogeneous cabinets need not compromise around (e.g., the programme by Sipilä 2015). Viewed from this perspective, the detailed programmes that specify agendas within the rationale of existing welfare state institutions seem to inevitably also acknowledge the societal function of the same institutions, and therefore, these programme formats seem to be in the interest of a maintenance of the social democratic welfare state, at least in the discursive project of the platforms. Furthermore, the results seem to suggest that a valence politics (see Stokes 1992) surrounding the values of the welfare state – universalist and egalitarian aims that all parties can agree upon – is more likely to occur in platforms that have been developed by professional cabinet politicians from different political backgrounds (as in the case of Katainen’s government) than in those developed by a smaller homogeneous right-wing group involving new governmental actors with less specialized knowledge of the welfare state’s institutional modus operandi (Sipilä’s current government, which includes the Finns party).

Compared to the earlier platforms, those from the early twenty-first century involve acting, renewing and changing the system. Some of the most recent are so filled with action plans, particularly Jyrki Katainen’s lengthy platform of 2011, as to be dizzying. In 2015, the decision by Juha Sipilä of the Centre Party to co-operate with the Finns Party to form a government of three parties whose basic ideological stance did not strongly conflict created opportunities for the type of managerial flexibility requested in the SITRA report, cited at the beginning of the article (Määttä & Sitra 2010). What can be drawn from this study is that Finland’s broad coalition governments have seemed to force the political platform discourse to include existing welfare state institutional logics and arrangements. Sipilä’s programme is more top-down and straightforward than earlier plans and deviates as well by resembling a company managerial strategy. In comparison, Esko Aho’s programme from the beginning of the 1990s entails a somewhat comprehensive welfare state ethos, which is almost completely lacking in Sipilä’s platform (Sipilä 2015). In fact, one can say that in view of the earlier statements, it was not until Stubbs’s short 2014 blueprint that greater universalist notions have disappeared altogether.

The ways in which the formats of the declarations pronounce executive goals reveal something about the relationship between the positions taken by the government in view of its executive institutions. Political historians have expressed the view that state capacity and bureaucratic auton-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>THE WELFARE STATE PROJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s-</td>
<td><strong>AIMS:</strong> From the 1950s, building a welfare state structure and system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td><strong>GENRE CHARACTER:</strong> Declarations, at first only a few paragraphs, then longer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CONCEPTS:</strong> From the end of the 1960s and through the 1970s: guaranteeing the rights of all citizen groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak groups are named and singled out as needing special attention and inclusion; 1968, “social questions”; 1970, “social policy and health care”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s-</td>
<td><strong>AIMS:</strong> Strengthening and improving the structure of the welfare state; internal synchronization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td><strong>GENRE CHARACTER:</strong> Programmes become lengthier. Express visions and give action statements. Use not only passive forms but also active forms and designated actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CONCEPTS:</strong> Programmes still envision a welfare state continuing to develop its service provisions and basic assistance, but the language now uses verbs for maintaining a certain level of service, improving the accessibility of existing service provisions and making these more efficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.B.: Lipponen’s second Government (1999) articulates the most extensive social political Programme on “social and health care policy, and work life” of all governments. A clear sense of social ethos and ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td><strong>AIM:</strong> Greatest emphasis is placed on declaring action. A new, sometimes vaguer role for the programmes vis-à-vis executive professionals in the public sector (not vague in Katainen’s programme 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>GENRE CHARACTER:</strong> Lengthy and detailed action plans for renewing Finland and keeping the country in sync with new challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.B.: Katainen’s (National Coalition Party) “six-pack” programme (2011) is extremely detailed, showing compromises but also enormous expertise and knowledge input by political professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CONCEPTS:</strong> Passive verb forms, phenomena, not actors. Citizens referred to as consumers (asiakas). “Finland” also referred to as an actor (the first time it was used to this extent since the Second World War).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td><strong>AIM:</strong> Strategic and vague aims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>GENRE CHARACTER:</strong> The Programme for 2015 resembles a managerial manual: the goal set for “wellbeing and health” is that in ten years, the Finnish people will be healthier and more experienced in coping with different life situations. These types of goals are symptomatic of the programme as a whole: it contains a vision for a self-confident people, as opposed to the structure- and value-based visions of Lipponen’s second government (1999); however, it shows lack of knowledge, experience and expertise compared to Katainen’s programme (2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CONCEPTS:</strong> Emphasis on action and “doing”. ‘Responsibility’ and ‘capacity’ by autonomous citizens; ‘choices’ are offered in service provision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over the years, paradigm shifts have occurred: from the view that Finland was a country that needed to address inequality, the perspective altered to articulating how to build a welfare state with social security and health services for all. Ultimately, it has come around to viewing problems of governance as lying elsewhere: there are issues other than social security and welfare. If the message of government programmes from the 1960s to the late 1980s was to “construct a system to address social and health problems collectively by institutionalizing the aims of universalism, equality, inclusion”, then the message at present is “we have other problems; let us manage the system better so that we can afford it”. The changes in focus, concepts and aims incorporate new views of citizens and public power. The citizen...
is free to choose, service provision is less centralized, and
governments actively seek less bureaucracy.

The most interesting programmes from a structural-
political perspective are Lipponen’s second (1999), which
can be viewed as the height of social welfare ethos and ac-
tion, and Katainen’s (2011), in which details of implement-
tion and the breadth of the questions bear witness to a po-
itical system in a particular situation (the coalition after the
electoral success of the True Finns). Finally, the present pro-
litical system in a particular situation (the coalition after the

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APPENDIX

Table 1. The respondents and the sample drawn from the Population Register of Finland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister (PM) and period in office</th>
<th>PM party adherence</th>
<th>Length (words)</th>
<th>Additions (words)</th>
<th>Total length (words)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33. Kekkonen I (17.3.1950-17.1.1951)</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>247</td>
<td></td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Kekkonen II (17.1.1951 - 20.9.1951)</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>268</td>
<td></td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Kekkonen III (20.9.1951 - 9.7.1953)</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>413</td>
<td></td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Kekkonen IV (9.7.1953 - 17.11.1953)</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>223</td>
<td></td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Tuomioja (17.11.1953 - 5.5.1954)</td>
<td>Care Taker (Right)</td>
<td>480</td>
<td></td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Törngren (5.5.1954 - 20.10.1954)</td>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>354</td>
<td></td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Fagerholm II (3.3.1956 - 27.5.1957)</td>
<td>Soc Dem</td>
<td>225</td>
<td></td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Sukselaainen (27.5.1957 - 29.11.1957)</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>751</td>
<td></td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. von Fieandt (29.11.1957 - 26.4.1958)</td>
<td>Civil Servants</td>
<td>631</td>
<td></td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Virolainen (12.9.1964 - 27.5.1966)</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Paasio (27.5.1966 - 22.3.1968)</td>
<td>Soc Dem</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Karjalainen II (15.7.1970 - 29.10.1971)</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>2,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. Aura II (29.10.1971 - 23.2.1972)</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>478</td>
<td></td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58. Miettunen II (30.11.1975 - 29.9.1976)</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>204 (2)</td>
<td>2,227 (3)</td>
<td>2,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. Sorsa II (15.5.1977 - 26.5.1979)</td>
<td>Soc Dem</td>
<td>514</td>
<td></td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63. Sorsa IV (6.5.1983 - 30.4.1987)</td>
<td>Soc Dem</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,787</td>
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<tr>
<td>64. Holkeri (30.4.1987 - 26.4.1991)</td>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>2860</td>
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<td>2860</td>
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<tr>
<td>67. Lipponen II (15.4.1999 - 17.4.2003)</td>
<td>Soc Dem</td>
<td>6698</td>
<td></td>
<td>6698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73. Stubb (24.6.2014-29.5.2015)</td>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>1912 (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. Sipilä (29.5.2015-)</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>9798</td>
<td></td>
<td>9798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Declaration of routines
2) Programme declaration
3) Programme from 4 March 1976
4) Continuation of Vanhanen’s Government
5) Continuation of Katainen’s Government